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In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of price discovery in the Brussels Stock Exchange
for the spot and forward stock markets. Specically, we quantitatively analyze each market's
process in impounding new fundamental information about a stock's value into its market
price. Similar to the permanent-transitory decomposition procedure put forward by Gonzalo
and Ng (2001), we use a vecm (Vector Error Correction Model) and decompose the vecm
residuals into the permanent and transitory innovations. However, we adjust their procedure
to accommodate for the asynchronism problem in the Brussels forward and spot stock exchange.
From the impulse response functions of the derived structural cointegration model after the
decomposition, we apply the price discovery measure proposed by Yan and Zivot (2007), which
is the absolute magnitude of cumulative price errors in the process of reecting a one-unit
change in the permanent innovation. In particular, we investigate which market makes less
errors while incorporating the full one-unit increase in the permanent innovation into its price.
Our nding is that the spot market outperforms the forwards one in the price discovery process.
This result contradicts the price discovery role conventionally ascribed to the forward market.
JEL G14, G12, G1The Dynamics of Price Discovery
in the Two-Tier Brussels Stock Exchange
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the price discovery process in the Brussel Stock Exchange (BSE) during
the period 1989 - 1996. In that period, the market still consisted of two trading tiers for stocks:
a \spot" market tier with third-day delivery, and for the most active stocks a parallel \forward"
tier with xed-date delivery. Both segments were order-driven, and their opening prices|the
only ones for which we have a fairly precise idea about the timing|were set via a call. The
trading in the forward market started at 10 a.m, on the other hand, the opening spot prices
were identied at 1.30 p.m. In addition, the forward market was cheaper, deeper, unhampered
by price limits, convenient also for short sales, fully computerized, and played by the pros; so
it looks likely to be the more ecient tier, with less noisy prices and doing most of the price
discovery work. Surprisingly, though, using short-run price-discovery regressions similar to
that of Margrabe and Silverman (1983), Bui & Sercu (2007) nd evidence indicating the spot
market may have been the more ecient one. The diagnosis is tentative, though, because their
methodology is not robust to asynchronism problems in their data. In addition, their simple
price-discovery models do not allow to discover the dynamics of how news gets incorporated
into prices. In this paper we try to improve their analysis on both these counts. Specically,
this paper quantitatively examines whether the forward market is the rst to fully reect new
fundamental information about a stock's value into its market price and whether it makes less
errors during the process of fully impounding this information; and the methodology does not
suer from asynchronism problems between spot and forward prices.
This research falls within the literature on price discovery, which is one of the central
functions of nancial markets. It is generally dened as a process of asset's price adjustment
to incorporate new information. For example, Schreiber and Schwartz (1986) interpret it as
\the search for an equilibrium price", Baillie et. al. (2002) as gathering and interpreting news
to determine nancial asset's price, or Lehmann (2002) as \ecient and timely incorportation
of the information implicit in investor trading into the market prices".
Within this price discovery literature, a two-step orthogonalization on the residuals of a
Vector Error-Correction Model (vecm) of a cointegrated system proposed by Gonzalo & NgThe Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 2
(2001) has been commonly used. In conventional vecm analysis, the residuals are usually
viewed as innovations to the variables in the systems. However, these residuals do not reveal
the source of the shocks. Gonzalo & Ng (2001) put forward a way of identifying the permanent
and transitory shocks (p-t) from a system of cointegrated variables according to whether
their eects are permanent or transitory. This isolation allows one to trace the propagating
mechanism of each type of shocks. Applying their denition of innovations according to their
degree of persistence, we adjust the vecm to accommodate for the asynchronism problem and
suggest a slightly dierent and more direct solution to the task of decomposing the vecm
residuals into permanent and transitory innovations.
After the decomposition into permanent and transitory components, the derived cointe-
grated system|commonly called a structural moving average (sma) system|is used to per-
form impulse response analysis. Specically, we examine the price adjustment process of the
forward and spot markets following a one-unit change in the permanent innovation, i.e after
the permanent innovation increases by BEF 11. This analysis answers the question of how
many days after this event it takes for each market to incorporate the full one-unit shock and
whether the forward market is the quicker tier. In addition, applying the measure of price-
discovery eciency loss proposed by Yan and Zivot (2007), we estimate the accumulated error
that each market makes while moving to the new fundamental value following the shock. A
bootstrap method is used to estimate the condence bands of the accumulated errors as well
as the dierence between these cumulative errors of the two markets. Our nding is that the
forward market makes signicantly more errors than the spot one, which again contradicts the
superior role of the forward tier one would have expected.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the markets and
the data. In section 3 we present the econometric framework, which includes the model of p-t
decomposition, the solution to the model, and the measure of price discovery eciency loss.
The empirical results are reported in section 4. Section 5 includes.
1The belgian Frank (BEF) was the local currency in those days.The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 3
2 The Two-Tier Brussels Stock Exchange: Institutional Back-
ground
Brussels used to have not only its own stock market (the Brussel Stock Exchange (BSE), since
2001 integrated into Euronext), but even a two-tiered one: a \spot" market tier with third-day
delivery, and for the most active stocks a parallel \forward" tier with xed-date delivery. There
used to be twenty-four xed such settlement dates per year, implying that the trading periods
typically lasted about two weeks|hence their name quinzaine, two-week period.2 Details
about the market organization are crucial for our analysis. In this section, we describe the
price mechanisms in the forward and spot market and the delivery rules as they applied during
the sample period.
2.1 The price mechanism in the forward tier
The forward market used to work via a pure public limit order book (which, during the sample
period, was kept by a version of Toronto's Computer-Aided Trading System, CATS). Thus,
although brokers were allowed to trade on their own account, they did not act as market
makers, and their main role on the oor was to pass on the orders from the public to the
exchange. At 9 p.m. the one-hour pre-market started, during which orders could be added
or withdrawn and CATS displayed a continuously updated preliminary market-clearing price.
Actual trading in the forward market started at 10 a.m., with a simultaneous call market for
all stocks. That is, at 10 a.m. limit orders were matched as far as possible, and executed.
For most stocks the opening represented a substantial part of the day's turnover. After the
opening round, the interactive trading session or \continuous market" started (10:00-16:30).
Throughout the continuous-market session, the four best unlled limit orders on the buying
and selling side were displayed on computer screens and could be taken up by any incoming
new order. Only brokers saw the screens: at the time of the sample, individual investors
just heard (or saw) the opening and close prices over the radio or on Teletext, at noon or in
the afternoon. Orders could also be matched directly, between brokers or in-house, provided
that the price was within the book's bid-ask spread and the trade was reported immediately
to the exchange. Large trades, i.e. blocks of at least BEF 50m (EUR 1,250,000) could be
2The forward market has now disappeared, following an EU-directed \T  t + 7 days" rule implemented in
the 1990s. London used to have a two-weekly xed-delivery system too, Paris had delivery at the end of the
month in its \forward" section for big stocks. (There also was a spot section for small stocks). Basel oered the
choice between several delivery dates.The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 4
Table 1: Tick Size in the Spot and Forward Market
price must be minimal percentage price change
a multiple of at lower end at top end
price range of scale of scale
BEF 1-500 1 100% 0.20%
BEF 502-1,500 2 0.40% 0.13%
BEF 1,505-5,000 5 0.33% 0.10%
BEF 5,010-10,000 10 0.20% 0.10%
BEF 10,025-50,000 25 0.25% 0.05%
BEF 50,050 50 0.10% |
Key One BEF is approximately EUR 0.025.
crossed or traded outside the BSE (often in London or Paris), but had also to be reported
immediately. There were no limits on consecutive forward price changes. Limit order and
trade prices were rounded according to a shedule shown in Table 1. Until the 1996 reform, the
exchange's minimum margin requirement for a forward trade was 25 percent, but the BSE left
the enforcement of this rule to the individual brokers (who bore the default risk). Securities
could be posted as margin; in fact, many investors left most or all of their stocks with a
their broker|most shares are bearer securities|and used this portfolio as margin for forward
positions. Thus, there was no opportunity cost associated with the margin.
Prices for all traded lots were shown, in sequence (but not time-stamped), in the of-
cial price list, later De Tijd and L'Echo de la Bourse. In the electronic records, only
open/close/high/low are available.
2.2 The Spot Price Mechanism
Due to its lower volume, the spot market was fully computerized much later (in 1996). Like
the forward tier, it was order-driven, but the implementation was fairly dierent. First, there
was no pre-market, so that the opening price was much more subject to noise than the forward
opening price even apart from volume eects. Second, because of the thinness of the market,
for most stocks there was just one trading round per day. A continuous market existed only for
the more active stocks (quoted on the \corbeille" segment), and even this continuous market
was not very active. Third, there was no centralized public order book kept by the exchange.
Rather, a few specialist brokers each kept their own books, and met sometime between 1 and
1.30 p.m. on the Exchange's oor to aggregate their information and identify the price that
maximizes trade from the combined order book. Fourth, for stocks that were not traded onThe Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 5
the parallel forward market there were daily price limits of 5 percent (for very thinly traded
stocks, traded on the parket segment) or 10 percent (for other stocks, traded on the \corbeille"
market); and, in the corbeille market, subsequent intraday price changes could not exceed 5
percent.
The actual pricing and trading was organized by a BSE ocial, who started by crying
out a price proposal. This price proposal equaled the price that maximized trade from the
order book if that price was within the price change limits; if not, the ocial announced the
price limit itself. In addition to the price proposal, the ocial also announced the direction
of the imbalance. If there was an excess supply (demand) at the proposed price, additional
purchase (sale) orders from the oor were sollicited to reduce the imbalance in the book. If the
remaining imbalance between supply and demand at the price limit was less than 50 percent,
the specialist would decide to 'reduce' most or all orders on the excess side, i.e. execute only
part of each order; the transaction price was then published in the nancial press with the
qualication \sellers reduced" or \buyers reduced". If at the price limit the imbalance between
supply and demand remained huge even after solliciting orders from the oor, there was no
trade at all, and the price limit was published as an indicative price. In practice, however,
when the imbalance was only slightly larger than 50 percent the stock's specialist brokers often
added buy or sell orders for their own account to prevent no-trade (and no-income) days.
As, around 1990, the spot market list contained about 300 stocks, the stock-by-stock
opening-call prices were set more or less sequentially; the exact timing of each stock's spot
xing was not registered.
The spot market had two sub-tiers. For about half the stocks, there was just one daily
xing; this was called the parket market. For stocks quoted on the corbeille, the xing was
followed by the traditional (blackboard-and-chalk) version of the continuous market: unlled
orders were chalked onto the blackboard and could be picked up from the oor, and orders
could also be matched directly on the oor at a price within the book's spread. For the corbeille
market, prices for all traded lots were shown, in sequence (but not time-stamped), in the ocial
price list but in the electronic records, only open/close/high/low are available. For the parket
stocks there is just the single price.
2.3 Settlement Rules
For the BSE, the other details of the actual settlement were similar for both market tiers. The
buyer payed via a bank transfer rather than by check. This means that there was no \mailThe Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 6
Table 2: Transaction costs, spot and forward, 1990
cost of cost of
item spot trades forward trades
BSE Commission 0.03%, max BEF 6 000y
Transaction Tax 0.17%, max BEF 10 000
Brokerage fees
- xed part BEF 200
- variable part:
order BEF 1-5m 1% .8%
order BEF 5-10m .8% .6%
order BEF 10-20m .4% .3%
order BEF 20-30m  BEF 130 000z .2%
order  BEF 30m  BEF 130 000z  BEF 120 000z
y : 40 BEF is worth approx. 1 EUR; * : plus BEF 100 for the buyer if physical delivery is asked; z : negotiable,
with the stated amounts as minima. Thus, a smallish trade of BEF 250,000 (approx. EUR 6.250) would cost
1.29 percent spot, and 1.09 percent forward. For an order of BEF 30m, the cost dierence may be as small as
10,000/30,000,000 = .033 percent.
oat" on the payment side. Still, the value dates for buyer and seller did not match perfectly:
the buyer's value date is one day before the actual settlement day, and the seller obtains value
one day after settlement.
Delivery of the stock could mean actual physical delivery of the piece of paper, if the
buyer desired so. Alternatively, the buyer could ask that his or her purchase be recorded
with a netting and depository institution, the Caisse Interprofessionelle/Interprofessionale
Kas (CIK). The CIK merely netted the physical deliveries across brokers if actual delivery is
asked, and held the paper on behalf of investors that did not demand physical delivery. Thus,
the CIK was not a clearing house in the usual sense: it did not act as a central counterpart, nor
did it cancel an individual investor's earlier purchases against subsequent sales (or vice versa)
within one settlement period. There was some informal clearing by brokers, though: brokers
did not exact delivery and payment for a forward transaction that was reversed later on via
the same brokerage house and within the same quinzaine.
One function of the forward market, therefore, was to reduce the cost and hassle of mutually
osetting stock deliveries and payments for trades that had been closed out within the same
quinzaine. This partly explains why, unlike in currency markets, in the forward tier the
transaction costs for small trades were somewhat lower than in the spot tier (as illustratedThe Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 7
in Table 2).3 A second useful feature of the forward tier is that it allows one to take short
positions until the end of the quinzaine, positions that could then be rolled over fairly easily.
In Belgium, there was no formal legal framework for asset borrowing and spot short-selling
until the 1991 Stock Market Reform Act, so until then the forward market provided the sole
organized opportunity for short positions. A third function of the forward market was to
provide the equivalent of buying on margin: the actual payment was deferred until the end of
the quinzaine (at which moment the forward contract could be rolled over), and the buyer just
posted the 25 percent security. Since leveraged buying was possible in the forward market, no
organized system of buying on margin was set up in the spot market.
2.4 Possible clientele and dierential information aspects
It is fair to say that the organization of the forward markets was superior: it was fully com-
puterized by the late 80s, had a pre-market, enjoyed lower costs and no price limits, and was
much deeper. In addition (or, perhaps, as a result of the above), conventional wisdom within
the nancial community held that there also was an clientele- and eciency-related form of
segmentation.4 Indeed, because of its shorting facilities and the absence of price limits, the
forward market had a somewhat more speculative reputation, to the extent that conservative
rms (such as the major banks) have long resisted a forward listing. Because of this speculative
image, the forward market was considered to be the market for the more professional agents,
while less sophisticated investors were said to prefer the spot market. Having no systematic
and fast access to news during working hours, these amateur traders allegedly reacted slower
than the professionals. In the terminology of Garbade and Silber (1983), this view hypothesizes
that the forward market was the price discoverer, while the spot market was just a (lagging)
satellite market. This hypothesis is the central issue of the paper.
2.5 Taxes
A last relevant detail is income tax. For brokers or corporations, all interest received or
paid and all short-term capital gains or losses are fully taxable or deductible. So if brokers
or corporations dominate the market in the sense that they are systematically the marginal
3Another reason for the lower transaction costs might have been the fact that the forward market tended to
have larger volumes than the spot market for the same stock.
4We are indebted to the late Prof. Emeritus Van Essche for this suggestion.The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 8
traders, taxes are neutral. Under personal taxation rules, capital gains or losses are not
taxable or deductible; nor can one deduct interest costs incurred to nance short-term trades;
and interest income is de facto taxed at the withholding tax (10 percent at the time). In short,
also for private persons the gross rate is the relevant interest rate, unless the marginal traders
are buyers of stock for whom the opportunity cost is a deposit.
Dividends are largely tax-exempt for corporations; for individuals, a 25-percent withholding
tax applies. Unpublished tests show that the average price drop on ex-dividend day was equal
to the dividend net of the withholding tax|20 percent before 1984, and 25 percent thereafter.
All returns are accordingly computed from dividends net of withholding taxes.
We conclude the descriptive section with some information on the data.
2.6 Data Description
The sample period starts early 1989, at which time the forward markets was fully computerized,
and ends in 1996; in 1997 the forward market disappeared. Euronext's historic-data CDs for
that period include the opening spot price per day, and, for the forward market, the daily
opening, high and low, and close price. Data on dividends, bonus dividends, splits, and rights
issues5 were missing, and were hand-collected from Memento der Eecten, a trade publication,
and from De Tijd, which published the Dutch-language version of the Ocial Price List.
We discarded foreign stocks, about half of the list, since price discovery for these shares
probably comes from abroad anyway. So we started from data on 119 Belgian stocks traded on
both the spot and forward tiers of the Brussels Stock Exchange during the period 1989-1996.
Some data cleaning was required: 17 stocks are excluded due to an insucient number of
observations (too many missing data points), 31 stocks are connected to the others due to the
change in the name or code after stock split or merger. Accordingly, 71 stocks remain. All
unusually large forward premia or large changes in the prices were double-checked with the
prices posted on the hard copies of De Tijd, including the next-day rectications for typos.
All prices that are qualied as sellers reduced, buyers reduced, or indicative, were considered
to be missing observations.6 The raw prices were then corrected for dierences in time to
5The subscription right is represented by a coupon and can be traded separately the moment the stock goes
ex this coupon. The market values of these \scripts" are very noisy so we worked with the standard theoretical
value of a subscription right.
6Since limit-order prices are from a grid, the supply and demand schedules do rarely \cross" precisely: there
almost always is some excess supply or demand left. Whenever the market holder could not close the gap byThe Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 9
settlement, by discounting them for the appropriate number of days. We used the one-week
call-money rate and the [calendar days]/360 time convention that then applied outside the
interbank market for bef. Thus, both price series can be viewed as separate but comparable
assessments of a true spot value. The impact of the discounting turned out to be so minute
that it could have been omitted without aecting any conclusion.
3 Econometric Framework
3.1 Preliminaries
Let Xt = (Ft St+4)
0
denote a 2  1 vector of prices for the stock trading in the forward and
spot markets respectively (Ft is the opening forward price observed at 10 a.m. on day t and
St+4 is the opening spot price observed at 1.30 p.m. on day t). Figure (3) below represents
the asynchronism between the two markets.
Figure 1: Time Asynchronism
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We assume each of these prices contains a random walk component so that Xt is a nonsta-
tionary process. These prices are integrated of order 1 or I(1), and the price changes, 4Xt, are
integrated of order zero, or I(0). We assume that 4Xt has a bivariate Vector Moving Average
solliciting additional orders from the oor but the imbalance is small, all orders were executed for the same
proportion (\buyers (or sellers) reduced"). Whenever the imbalance was large, no trade was allowed and an
indicative price was published.The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 10
(vma) or Wold presentation below:
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6= 0 if t = s   1,
0 otherwise.
(3)
The variance-covariance matrix E[ete
0
t 1] is non-zero because of the time-overlap between
the two periods (t 1;t) and (t+4 2;t+4 1) (see Figure 3). In case of time-synchronism,
that is when 4 = 0, this variance-covariance matrix is zero. So, from the vma representation
(1), the only adjustment of the standard vma due to the presence of the asynchronism 4




The matrix polynomial 	(L) = 	(1) + (1   L)	(L) has the property that 	(z) is 1-
summable, and 	(z) is full rank everywhere on jzj  1.
The Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition of 	(L) results in the representation of the price
levels:
Xt = X0 + 	(1)
t X
s=1
es + 	(L)et (4)
In this presentation, 	(1) contains the long-run impact of a innovation on each of the
prices. Hasbrouck (1995) shows that since the dierence between the two prices is stationary,
this cointegration system has a cointegration vector 0 = (1   1). Consequently, 0	(1) = 0
and the rows of 	(1) are identical. Let 	(1) =

 1  2
 1  2

.
In order to estimate the matrix polynomial 	(L) of the vma dierence presentation (1),
we rst regress a vecm representation of Xt and then deduce the elements of 	(L) in the same




Xt 1 +  (L)4Xt 1 + et; (5)
where  (L) is of nite order (K   1).The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 11
3.2 Model: P-T Decomposition & Transformation from vma to sma repre-
sentation
A clear interpretation of price discovery is possible in a structural model, in which the types
of shocks are identied. The standard model, rst proposed by Gonzalo & Ng (2001), allows
for a modest departure from the homogenous-expectations setting, in the sense that the two
market tiers receive the same signals but may weigh them dierently. One signal is the true
fundamental news that triggers a change in the economic value of the asset, and the other
signal just reects friction or noise. Almost tautologically, the eect of true news on the value
generates a permanent change, while the noise signal is transitory, i.e., undone in the end.
Denoting these signals by P and T, respectively, and still in the absence of an asynchrony
problem, the standard model then relates the innovations in the spot and forward prices to
these signals as follows: 8
<
:
ef;t = d1 P
t + d2 T
t ;
es;t = d3 P
t + d4 T
t :
(6)
We need to modify the notation and the model to accommodate for the asynchronism
problem between the two markets. Divide the one-day period [t   1;t) into two subperiods
[t   1;t + 4   1) and [t + 4   1;t) as illustrated in gure (2)|basically the morning and
the afternoon/overnight period, respectively. Let the permanent and transitory shocks in













. Those shocks then underly the innovations in the vec model with the proviso
that in the spot market the trading day starts at noon rather than in the morning:
Figure 2: Permanent-Transitory Decomposition
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contains the initial impacts of the structural shocks
on 4Xt, and where the structural shocks are assumed to be serially and mutually uncorrelated.
In the original model with synchronized markets, the two innovations allow us to back out
the two signals once the four weights di have been identied. (Actually, one of the ds can be
xed arbitrarily since its eect can be captured by rescaling the etas.) With asynchronous
prices, however, we have four etas underlying the two innovations, so at best we can obtain the
second moments of the variables, not the values themselves. To identify these moments and
the weights d we also need to impose one more condition. In a rst approach we assume that















This ratio of volatilities can be estimated from the observed residuals et as follows:
cov(ef;t;es;t+4) = d1d3var(
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If the p-t decomposition in (7) is identied, i.e. coecients d1, d2, d3, and d4 are estimated,
we can trace the propagating mechanism of the permanent and transitory shocks on the prices.
Therefore, the task is to nd a solution for d1, d2, d3, and d4 so that the a priori restrictions
imposed on the permanent and transitory the shocks are satised. We rst rewrite the p-tThe Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 13
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, (with L 1 being a lead operation, e.g. L 1et =






















With a decomposition of this form, the vma presentation (1) becomes a structural moving
average (sma). Let us dene
D(L) := 	(L)G(L); (14)
whose eight elements will be denoted as D(L) =

d11(L) d12(L) d13(L) d14(L)
d21(L) d22(L) d23(L) d24(L)

. Then
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with dij(L) (for i = 1, 2 and j = 1 to 4) being scalar polynomials:
dij(L) = dij;0 + dij;1L + dij;2L2 + :::: with i = 1 or 2 and j = 1 to 4: (18)




t are interpreted as new information on the
fundamental value of the underlying asset, released during the corresponding periods [t;t +
4 1) and [t+4 1;t). Being fundamental, this information permanently moves the market
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= d21(1) = 1; (20)The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 14































= d22(1) = 1: (22)
The transitory innovation T
t , in contrast, is the result of all non information-related fric-
tions, such as the trading by uninformed or liquidity traders, inventory adjustments, and any
random temporary order imbalance. The dening characteristic of T
t is that it has no long-run




































= d24(1) = 0: (26)
As a corollary, we infer from (19)-(26) that
D(1) =

d11(1) d12(1) d13(1) d14(1)





1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0

: (28)
Moreover, since D(L)  	(L)G(L), we have
D(1) = 	(1)G(1); (29)
=

 1  2
 1  2

d1 d1 d2 d2





 1d1 +  2d3  1d1 +  2d3  1d2 +  2d4  1d2 +  2d4
 1d1 +  2d3  1d1 +  2d3  1d2 +  2d4  1d2 +  2d4

: (31)
Combining (28)and (31) we obtain the following conditions for G(L):
 1d1 +  2d3 = 1; (32)
 1d2 +  2d4 = 0: (33)The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 15
So the transformation from the vma in (1) to the sma in (17) is complete if the coecients of
the matrix G(L) (rst mentioned in (13)) are identied, satisfying the conditions in (32) and
(33). In such a case, D(L) is identied as in (14).
3.3 Solving the model
Restate the model. Starting from vma: 4Xt = 	(L)et, the task is to nd a solution for
coecients d1, d2, d3, and d4 such that the following three conditions are met:




















(ii) Dening characteristics of p-t innovations (Conditions (32) and (33)):












t ) = 0 with i, j = 1 or 2: (36)










t ) = 0: (38)
(v) Constant noise/signal variance ratios:
var(
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t ) = var(
T2
t ): (40)
These ve conditions suce to uniquely solve for the four coecients d1, d2, d3, and d4, as
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t ) + d2d4var(
T1
t ): (44)The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 16
Replacing var(
P1
t ) by var(
P2
t ) and var(
T1
t ) by var(
T2
























The four equations (34), (45), (46), and (47) are sucient to solve for the four unknowns
d1;d3;var(
P2
t ) and var(
T2
t ) as followings (see the appendix for the details):
d1 =
(1 + ) 2cov(ef;t;es;t+4) +  1var(ef;t)
 2




(1 + ) 1cov(ef;t;es;t+4) +  2var(es;t+4)
 2
1var(ef;t) + 2(1 + ) 1 2cov(ef;t;es;t+4) +  2
2var(es;t+4)
: (50)




d2 =   2;
d4 =  1:
(51)
Equations (49), (50), and (51) are the complete solution for the matrix G(L). Therefore,
the permanent and transitory decomposition has been identied in the sense that the weights
underlying the spot and forward innovations are known.
3.4 Measuring Price Discovery
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where the polynomial D(L) can be identied via equation (14).
From this sma presentation, we investigate the relative speed of price adjustment toward
the stock's new equilibrium price following a one-unit change in the permanent innovation P
t .
More specically, we estimate how many days after the event it takes before each market has
fully incorporated the one-unit change in the shock into its price. The quicker market has a
greater contribution to price discovery.The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 17
From (52), the expected price response in each market, k days after a one-unit increase, to



































d2i;l; k = 0; 1; :::; i = 1 or 2 (54)
From this response function, we estimate for each stock the price adjustment speeds. These
parameters, kf and ks, are dened as the smallest number of days needed to ensure the price
response fF
i;kf = 1 and fS
i;ks = 1.
As a second measure we adopt the price-discovery eciency loss of Yan & Zivot (2007).
The dynamics eciency of market i at a given horizon k in response to a one-unit permanent
shock may be characterized by fi;k  1, that is, the dierence between expected price response,
fi;k, and the long-run response, one unit. Given a non-negative loss function L, Yan and Zivot







i;k   1j with i = 1; 2; (55)
where K is a truncation lag chosen such that fF






i;k   1j with i = 1; 2; (56)
where K is a truncation lag chosen such that fS
i;K t 1.
3.5 Time Synchronism and Comparison with P-T Decomposition of Gon-
zalo & Ng (2001)
When 4 = 0, the model collapses to the case of synchronous prices (the prices Ft and St
are observed at the same moment on day t), as pictured in Figure 3. In this case, we also
decompose the standard vecm residuals ef;t and es;t into p-t innovations P
t and T
t . Starting











bivariate moving average of the price vector Xt = (Ft St)
0
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where et = (ef;t es;t)
0














such that the following
three conditions, which correspond to the three conditions in Subsection 2.3, are met:
(i) p-t decomposition:


















(ii) From dening characteristics of the p-t innovations:







(iii) Orthogonality condition (by construction)
cov(P
t ;T
t ) = 0: (62)The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 19
Repeating the solution in the asynchronism case, we have the following synchrony solution
to d1, d2, d3, d4 problem:
d2 =   2; (63)
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where the parameter det(D0) =  can be any real number as one d can be xed arbitrarily.





































We lastly link this to the approach by Gonzalo & Ng (2001). In their procedure, the vecm
residuals are orthogonalized in two steps. The rst step separates the permanent from the







et are chosen to be the permanent and
transitory shocks, respectively. The second step uses a Choleski decomposition to obtain a set




, that are mutually orthogonal: t = H 1ut




and H is the Choleski decomposition of cov(u). According to Gonzalo





will `knock out' the appropriate terms in the vecm and moving-
average representations of 4Xt to isolate those components with the desired degree
of integration".
However, in our solution for the p-t decomposition, the choice for the transitory shocks does




Except for this dierence, our solution to the task of decomposing permanent and transitory
7? is the 2x1 orthogonal complement of  such that 
0
? = 0. According to Baillie. et. al. (2002),

0
? = ( 1  2)
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innovations from the vecm residuals is similar to their two-step procedure, at least in the case
of synchronism.
4 Empirical Results
The unit-root test was performed for all the 71 stocks. Then, the cointegrated model VEC(K 
1) in (5) with K chosen to minimize the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was estimated
for all of them. For the sake of brevity, we omit the full results and just describe the general
characteristics of the coecient estimates. For all the stocks, the prices are consistent with the
hypotheses of a unit root and of a cointegration relation between the forward and spot prices.
In addition, the coecients of the cointegration vector  and adjustment speed  are clearly
dierent from zero, and the cointegration vector 
0
is not signicantly dierent from the vector
(1  1)
0
. This is, of course, consistent with the prediction that the dierence between the two
prices is stationary.
The correlation between ef;t and es;t+4 is signicant, as expected since the two 24-hour
periods overlap by some 20.5 hours; more surprisingly, though, the cross-correlation is not.
Notably, for almost all the cases (70 out of 71 stocks), the correlation between the forward
residual, ef;t, and the lagged spot residual, es;t+4 1, is not statistically signicant even though
the two open-to-open periods overlap by about 3.5 hours. As a result, the ratio of the perma-
nent and transitory shocks' volatility  estimated in (11) is insignicant. Therefore, although
the opening forward and spot prices are determined at dierent moments on a day, the volatility
of the permanent and transitory innovations during this period of 4 = 3:5 hours are insignif-
icant (see formula (8) for reference). One implication, with hindsight, is that we could have
ignored the asynchrony and just followed the standard procedure presented in subsection 3.5.
We come back to the economic interpretation of this nding in the nal section.
The matrix polynomial 	(L) of the vma presentation (1) is then estimated from the
VEC(K  1) using the procedure in Yan & Zivot (2007). For each stock, the price-adjustment
speed, kf and ks, and price-discovery-eciency losses PDELF
2 (K) and PDELS
2(K) in (55)
and (56), are then estimated. We do not present results on the price-discovery-eciency losses
PDELF
1 (K) and PDELS
1(K) that correspond to 
P1
t because the volatility of 
P1
t is insignif-
icant as shown above. In addition, the 5- and 95% quantile condence intervals of the price
discovery measure are computed using the bootstrap procedure with 1000 sampling times. The
next subsections present the empirical results in detail.The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 21
4.1 Speed of Price Adjustment












12 5 4 9
Stock - market turnover (rank; increasing)
forward_days
spot_days
Table 3: Speed of Price Adjustment








All 5.58 5 4.73 4 41 15 15
Low 5.54 6 5.58 6 10 5 9
Medium 5.39 5 3.87 4 16 5 2
High 5.79 5 4.71 4 15 5 4
* in number of days;
** in number of cases.
Figure 4 and Table 3 report the speed of price adjustment of the forward and spot markets,
which is measured by the number of days the market prices take to fully incorporate a one-unit
change in the fundamental innovation. The stocks are ranked on the basis of their average
daily turnover, from low to high. Out of the total 71 stocks, forward prices adjust more slowly
in 41 cases (10 low-turnover, 16 medium, and 15 high), and faster in 15 cases (9 low-turnover,
2 medium, 4 high). In the remaining 15 cases (5 low-turnover, 5 medium, 5 high), the forward
and spot prices have an equal speed. In addition, Table 3 also presents the mean and median
of the price adjustment speed of the two markets. The general picture from these summary
statistics is that on average it takes around 5.5 days for the forward market to fully response to
a one-unit shock, whereas it takes around 4.5 days for the spot market to do so. Put dierently,The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 22








































day 1 day 2 day 3 day 4 day 5 day 6
on average the forward market is one day slower than the spot one in responding to the shock.
Figure 5 and Table 4 report the mean and median of the price response for all the stocks
and for each turnover group in the rst six days after a one-unit shock. On the rst day,
on average of the total 71 stocks, the forward market incorporates 76% of the shock (91%
low-turnover, 73% medium, and 65% high), whereas for the spot one the gure is 97% (102%
low-turnover, 95% medium, and 93% high). On the second day, the spot prices almost hit
the new fundamental value, while the forward prices are still around 5% below. By the fth
and sixth days, both markets have responded fully to the shock. Another characteristic being
seen from Figure 5 and Table 4 is that the spot prices seem to overreact to the shock on
the third and the fourth days before going back to the new fundamental level. Consequently,
one question arising from this feature is that whether they accumulate more error during the
process of fully impounding this new information. The next part will look into this issue.
In sum, the forward tier is slower than the spot one in reacting to new fundamental infor-
mation. This comparative slowness in the forward market is unexpected, in view of its higher
volume, superior organization, and lower costs. There also seems to be no clear tendency for
the adjustment period to shorten in the forward market, the higher the stock's liquidity.The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 23
Table 4: Price Adjustment, Mean & Median
day 1 day 2 day 3 day 4 day 5 day 6
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median
fw 0.76 0.71 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 All
sp 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
fw 0.91 0.86 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 Low
sp 1.02 1.03 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00
fw 0.73 0.72 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Medium
sp 0.95 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
fw 0.65 0.62 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 High
sp 0.93 0.93 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
Key The entries `low', `medium', and `high' refer to turnover classes, each containing 24, 23 and 24 stocks,
respectively; `fw' and `sp' are for forward and spot, respectively.














4.2 Price Discovery Eciency Loss
Recall that the eciency loss is dened on the basis of the estimated sensitivities of the expected
prices for days t; t+1; :::;t+K to a one-unit shock Pi occuring at time t. In a perfect market,
this sensitivity equals unity for the contemporaneous price. So Yan and Zivot (2007) add up
all absolute deviations between the sensitivities and unity, over the number of days it takes for
the cumulative adjustment to become complete. Figure 6 presents the point estimates and the
5- and 95% quantile intervals of price-discovery-eciency-loss in the forward market, Figure 7
for the spot tier, and Figure 8 for the dierence of the loss between the two markets. Since
the statistic is a sum of nonnegative numbers, its distribution is highly right-skewed. In the
forward market, there seems to be a (weak) tendency for the losses to rise when turnover isThe Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 24














higher, which is a puzzling eect; for the spot tier there seems to be no such tendency. To
get a clearer picture we show the dierences, stock by stock, of the eciency losses forward
minus spot, along with the 5-95% condence intervals from the bootstrap. Out of the 71 total
number of cases, the forward prices have a higher eciency loss in 59 cases, of which 41 are
signicant with the lower condence bound exceeding zero. So, all the empirical results again
suggest that the spot market contributed more to the price discovery process than the forward
one.
Equally unexplicable, the bad performance of the forward market is worst among the most
active stocks: for each and every stock in the top third the forward market seems slower, and
likewise for all but two of the middle third; only in the low-activity stocks the performance is
about even. The signicant ones are also concentrated: 21/23 in the top, 17/24 in the middle,
and 7/24 in the lower third. Of the twelve cases where the forward market does better, only
four are signicant, of which three are in the low-activity third.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an adjustment to the standard structural cointegration model for
price changes in arbitrage linked markets. In general, this adjusted model allows us to cope
with asynchronism problem between the spot and forward markets when examining the prices'
dynamic process of converging to the new equilibrium prices. Additionally, it helps to reveal
whether the asynchronism in the observed prices is signicant or not.The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 25













Upon tting the adjusted model with the data in the BSE, we nd that the asynchronism
problem is statistically insignicant for almost all the stocks. In the math of this model, the
interpretation would be that there is no news whatsoever between 10:00 and 13:30, but this
is of course unconvincing as a description of reality. A more reasonable explanation for this
could be that any fundamental shocks happening during the morning were not reected in the
opening spot price observed at 1.30 p.m. of the same day. For example, the bulk of the spot
limit orders may have been submitted at the same time as forward ones and may rarely have
been updated in light of what happened in the forward tier. This would t in with the view of
one practitioner, who described the spot tier as the market for smaller private investors who
read newspapers after work and submit orders before work the next day.
Yet that view, if true, does not seem to mean that these small investors are less adept
at digesting the news. With the adjusted structural cointegration model, we perform an
impulse response analysis to examine the price adjustment process of the forward and spot
markets following a one-unit change in the permanent innovation, i.e after the permanent
innovation increases by BEF 1. The result shows that after this event it takes longer time for
the forward prices to incorporate the full one-unit shock in the majority of cases. Next, we apply
the measure of the price-discovery-dynamics proposed by Yan and Zivot (2007) to estimate
the accumulated error that each market makes while moving to the new fundamental value
following a fundamental shock. Our results are that the forward market makes signicantly
more errors than the spot one. So, we can conclude that the forward market failed to play the
superior role one would have expected. There seems to be no obvious reason why this wouldThe Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 26
be the case. Equally unexplicably, the comparatively poor performance is concentrated among
the bigger stocks.
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Appendix A
This appendix shows that (49) and (50) are the unique solution of the four equations (34),
(45), (46), and (47), which are rewritten below:

















t ) + d2d4var(
T2
t ) (71)
where d2, d4, and  are coecients that can be estimated as d2 =   2, d4 =  1, and  =
cov(ef;t;es;t+4 1)
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From (68) and (77), we have the solution for d1 and d3:
d1 =
(1 + ) 2cov(ef;t;es;t+4) +  1var(ef;t)
 2




(1 + ) 1cov(ef;t;es;t+4) +  2var(es;t+4)
 2
1var(ef;t) + 2(1 + ) 1 2cov(ef;t;es;t+4) +  2
2var(es;t+4)
: (79)
Table 5: Speed of Price Adjustment














20 9 7 15 4 6 25 5 4
82 5 3 287 2 2 40 5 1
11 8 6 268 5 4 57 8 4
21 5 6 52 6 4 68 3 6
269 3 4 9 7 7 35 5 5
24 6 6 36 6 6 34 4 4
56 7 7 260 4 3 30 6 4
8 6 5 66 3 5 13 5 4
23 2 5 76 8 5 39 2 3
293 4 4 290 3 1 61 18 17
7 8 4 71 5 3 67 3 3
32 4 6 10 9 7 46 6 4
77 8 8 72 5 4 78 7 5
55 4 7 29 5 3 19 4 5
70 8 4 60 4 4 1 6 4
16 6 3 289 7 5 65 4 4
31 6 5 5 11 2 59 10 7
73 5 7 48 2 1 47 4 4
291 6 6 26 6 3 43 4 3
51 4 9 58 7 3 69 5 2
296 7 6 64 5 5 27 7 4
53 2 7 37 5 2 41 4 5
62 4 2 17 5 4 63 8 7
292 6 7 42 6 4The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 30
Table 6: Price Discovery Eciency Loss - Forward (5-95% quantile intervals)
Low-turnover stocks Medium-turnover stocks High-turnover stocks
stockid 5% ELoss 95% stockid 5% ELoss 95% stockid 5% ELoss 95%
20 0.34 0.80 1.88 15 0.29 0.32 0.47 25 0.48 0.71 1.75
82 0.16 0.24 0.68 287 0.05 0.11 0.25 40 0.25 0.36 0.49
11 0.21 0.31 0.48 268 0.36 0.60 0.88 57 0.42 0.56 0.82
21 0.09 0.15 0.39 52 0.09 0.24 0.42 68 0.25 0.37 0.67
269 0.04 0.09 0.24 9 0.05 0.19 0.39 35 0.44 0.59 0.75
24 0.23 0.41 0.63 36 0.29 0.42 0.59 34 0.11 0.20 0.34
56 0.06 0.20 0.49 260 0.23 0.38 0.58 30 0.31 0.45 0.60
8 0.15 0.29 0.45 66 0.21 0.31 0.55 13 0.31 0.51 0.81
23 0.08 0.18 0.37 76 0.54 0.75 1.04 39 0.18 0.25 0.35
293 0.07 0.17 0.26 290 0.02 0.06 0.19 61 1.75 2.27 3.03
7 0.32 0.56 0.93 71 0.38 0.50 0.65 67 0.38 0.47 0.63
32 0.04 0.07 0.51 10 0.15 0.60 2.14 46 0.52 0.64 0.78
77 0.14 0.46 1.58 72 0.40 0.55 0.89 78 0.40 0.61 0.84
55 0.27 0.39 0.67 29 0.22 0.34 0.49 19 0.34 0.41 0.55
70 0.35 0.54 0.79 60 0.11 0.22 0.33 1 0.49 0.61 0.76
16 0.42 0.54 1.22 289 0.42 0.62 0.85 65 0.22 0.30 0.44
31 0.24 0.44 0.71 5 0.53 0.65 1.46 59 0.41 0.67 1.00
73 0.17 0.35 0.64 48 0.12 0.18 0.28 47 0.23 0.35 0.54
291 0.18 0.30 0.47 26 0.22 0.43 0.67 43 0.54 0.66 0.98
51 0.04 0.10 0.28 58 0.46 0.64 0.86 69 0.33 0.41 0.57
296 0.17 0.37 0.63 64 0.29 0.40 0.58 27 0.41 0.58 0.82
53 0.31 0.36 0.57 37 0.36 0.49 0.63 41 0.31 0.37 0.46
62 0.12 0.26 0.42 17 0.38 0.53 0.81 63 0.49 0.72 1.01
292 0.34 0.49 0.68 42 0.55 0.68 0.83The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 31
Table 7: Price Discovery Eciency Loss - Spot (5-95% quantile intervals)
Low-turnover stocks Medium-turnover stocks High-turnover stocks
stockid 5% ELoss 95% stockid 5% ELoss 95% stockid 5% ELoss 95%
20 0.39 0.73 2.76 15 0.16 0.22 0.32 25 0.39 0.62 1.63
82 0.57 0.83 1.54 287 0.06 0.12 0.19 40 0.01 0.02 0.09
11 0.29 0.47 0.65 268 0.07 0.17 0.37 57 0.13 0.16 0.34
21 0.11 0.18 0.32 52 0.05 0.13 0.20 68 0.10 0.18 0.26
269 0.04 0.11 0.26 9 0.19 0.36 0.51 35 0.17 0.21 0.28
24 0.05 0.13 0.21 36 0.05 0.12 0.20 34 0.04 0.12 0.18
56 0.09 0.32 0.49 260 0.09 0.16 0.29 30 0.03 0.05 0.12
8 0.07 0.15 0.23 66 0.06 0.16 0.44 13 0.06 0.17 0.37
23 0.30 0.51 0.78 76 0.11 0.23 0.40 39 0.01 0.03 0.07
293 0.08 0.12 0.30 290 0.02 0.02 0.18 61 1.63 2.25 3.04
7 0.09 0.15 0.31 71 0.11 0.18 0.26 67 0.04 0.07 0.15
32 0.08 0.26 0.56 10 0.12 0.30 1.40 46 0.10 0.17 0.26
77 0.35 0.77 1.47 72 0.17 0.32 0.62 78 0.05 0.07 0.20
55 0.27 0.40 0.54 29 0.01 0.04 0.10 19 0.04 0.07 0.19
70 0.17 0.25 0.40 60 0.03 0.06 0.10 1 0.11 0.19 0.28
16 0.24 0.28 0.68 289 0.15 0.26 0.44 65 0.04 0.08 0.14
31 0.06 0.16 0.26 5 0.38 0.53 1.34 59 0.06 0.11 0.27
73 0.16 0.25 0.39 48 0.01 0.02 0.10 47 0.06 0.09 0.31
291 0.08 0.15 0.22 26 0.03 0.08 0.19 43 0.18 0.26 0.50
51 0.16 0.51 1.36 58 0.17 0.23 0.37 69 0.01 0.02 0.10
296 0.07 0.16 0.25 64 0.07 0.11 0.18 27 0.09 0.15 0.32
53 0.25 0.33 0.40 37 0.06 0.09 0.15 41 0.14 0.18 0.24
62 0.06 0.05 0.41 17 0.23 0.30 0.48 63 0.14 0.29 0.50
292 0.17 0.26 0.37 42 0.14 0.22 0.33The Dynamics of Price Discovery in the BSE 32
Table 8: Price Discovery Eciency Loss - Forward-Spot (5-95% quantile intervals)
Low-turnover stocks Medium-turnover stocks High-turnover stocks
stockid 5% ELoss 95% stockid 5% ELoss 95% stockid 5% ELoss 95%
20 -1.28 0.07 0.50 15 0.03 0.10 0.26 25 -0.07 0.09 0.27
82 -1.16 -0.59 -0.11 287 -0.09 -0.01 0.12 40 0.21 0.34 0.42
11 -0.30 -0.15 0.01 268 0.24 0.42 0.55 57 0.25 0.40 0.52
21 -0.14 -0.02 0.19 52 -0.02 0.11 0.31 68 0.04 0.18 0.53
269 -0.15 -0.02 0.13 9 -0.26 -0.17 -0.03 35 0.23 0.38 0.52
24 0.10 0.29 0.53 36 0.15 0.30 0.50 34 0.00 0.08 0.22
56 -0.19 -0.12 0.07 260 0.10 0.22 0.35 30 0.22 0.40 0.55
8 0.02 0.14 0.30 66 -0.13 0.15 0.38 13 0.21 0.34 0.48
23 -0.61 -0.33 -0.03 76 0.36 0.52 0.69 39 0.14 0.22 0.32
293 -0.15 0.05 0.10 290 -0.09 0.04 0.12 61 -0.25 0.02 0.30
7 0.13 0.41 0.70 71 0.23 0.32 0.42 67 0.31 0.40 0.50
32 -0.38 -0.19 0.24 10 -0.14 0.29 0.75 46 0.39 0.47 0.54
77 -0.97 -0.31 0.94 72 0.04 0.23 0.47 78 0.27 0.54 0.69
55 -0.14 -0.02 0.31 29 0.15 0.30 0.45 19 0.24 0.34 0.43
70 0.10 0.29 0.46 60 0.05 0.16 0.27 1 0.35 0.43 0.50
16 -0.04 0.26 0.67 289 0.23 0.35 0.47 65 0.10 0.22 0.39
31 0.02 0.28 0.63 5 -0.61 0.13 0.85 59 0.26 0.57 0.76
73 -0.11 0.10 0.40 48 0.05 0.16 0.23 47 0.03 0.27 0.40
291 0.02 0.15 0.33 26 0.13 0.35 0.54 43 0.29 0.40 0.55
51 -1.21 -0.41 -0.05 58 0.25 0.41 0.54 69 0.26 0.39 0.51
296 -0.02 0.21 0.53 64 0.15 0.29 0.48 27 0.29 0.43 0.54
53 -0.05 0.03 0.29 37 0.27 0.40 0.52 41 0.12 0.19 0.27
62 -0.14 0.21 0.27 17 0.07 0.24 0.39 63 0.31 0.43 0.55
292 0.08 0.23 0.40 42 0.39 0.46 0.52